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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Daniel Ray Keyes II appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after
a jury found him guilty of first degree arson. Specifically, he claims the district
court committed reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In the early-morning hours of August 11, 2008, a fire occurred at a duplex
in which Keyes and his girlfriend lived. (Trial Tr., p.59, Ls.9-16, p.92, Ls.11-25.)
Keyes was seen by his neighbor attempting to extinguish the fire with a garden
hose; shortly thereafter, Keyes drove away from the scene in his car. (Trial Tr.,
p.59, Ls.3-19, p.419, Ls.1-9.)

When Keyes returned to the scene during the

aftermath of the fire and the ensuing investigation by the fire department, he told
the investigators that, earlier in the evening, he had burned several of his
girlfriend's personal items in the fireplace, and that the fireplace burned through
to the garage. (Trial Tr., p.359, L.3 - p.360, L.16, p.400, L.16 - p.411, L.13.)
Keyes was charged with first-degree arson. (R., pp.54-55.)
The lead investigator on the fire scene was Fire Inspector Halverson, who
was assisted by Deputy Fire Chief Lauper. (Trial Tr., p.330, L.24 - p.334, L.4.)
Both testified at Keyes's trial regarding their investigation and the conclusions
they had drawn about the cause of the fire.
Inspector Halverson testified that, as a result of their investigation and in
light of his training and experience, he had concluded there were at least two
points of origin of the fire, one in the garage and one in front of the fireplace.
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(Trial Tr., p.283, Ls.13-24.)

Inspector Halverson further testified that he had

reached a conclusion regarding the cause of the fire:

A:

The cause of the fire is intentional.

Q:

And intentional by what?

A:

Intentional by someone lit the fire and caused a fire to happen.

Q:

And not that the fireplace didn't malfunction?

A:

I'm sorry?

Q:

And that the fireplace did not malfunction?

A:

Correct.

(Trial Tr., p.290, Ls.7-23.) Keyes did not object to this testimony.
Deputy Fire Chief Lauper also testified as to the investigators' belief that
there was more than one point of origin of the fire, and that one of these was
located about four or five feet in front of the fireplace hearth, where there was a
large burn hole in the living room floor. (Trial Tr., p.339, L.3 - p.340, L.23.) The
investigators concluded that the fire at this point of origin was not merely caused
by burning items falling out of the fireplace, because there was no burn pattern
connecting the hole in the floor back to the fireplace hearth; it simply was an unconnected hole in the floor. (Trial Tr., p.340, Ls.12-23.) After Deputy Fire Chief
Lauper testified further, the prosecutor again brought the questioning around to
discuss the origins of the fire:
Q:

Now, based upon your experience and training, do you have
an opinion as to ihe origin of these - of this fire?

A:

I do.

Q:

And what is that?
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A:

It's an incendiary fire.
defendant.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

The fire was deliberately set by the

Objection. Motion for a mistrial.

(Trial Tr., p.350, Ls.17 -25.) The district court's response was immediate:
The objection is sustained. The jury will disregard the statements
of the witness attributing fault to the defendant. That's the province
of the jury. The witness knows and should know and counsel
should know that that is not proper for him to be stating. And you
will disregard it. That is your function. It is not his function.
(Trial Tr., p.351, Ls.1-8.)
After the court denied the motion and directed the state to restate the
question, Deputy Fire Chief Lauper testified regarding his opinion that the point
of origin of the fire was in the living room, and that the garage was another
potential point of origin. (Trial Tr., p.352, Ls.3-21.) He then testified about his
contact with Keyes after he returned to the scene during the investigation before
the state asked its last series of questions of Deputy Fire Chief Lauper:
Q:

Can you indicate to this jury, based upon your experience
and training, Chief, was the cause of this fire an accident,
based upon your years of experience?

A:

This fire was not an accident.

Q:

What was the cause of the fire?

A:

It was incendiary.

Q:

And what does "incendiary" mean?

A:

Incendiary means that it was an intentional, it was a
deliberate act to burn property of another person.

(Trial Tr., p.363, L.18 - p.364, L.3.) Keyes did not object to this testimony. The
court then took a break for the lunch hour. (Trial Tr., p.364, Ls.6-10.)
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After the lunch break, Keyes' counsel brought to the district court's
attention the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46,
813 P.2d 857 (1990), and a discussion was held off the record regarding the
case and its applicability to Keyes's motion for mistrial. (Trial Tr., p.365, Ls.724.) Upon coming back on the record, the district court indicated it had reviewed
the case, considered it sufficiently distinguishable from Keyes's case, and again
denied Keyes's motion for a mistrial. (Trial Tr., p.365, L.23 - p.366, L.14.) The
district court told Keyes that he was welcome to keep the issue open and brief it
in further detail at the conclusion of the trial. (Trial Tr., p.366, Ls.14-17.)
On cross-examination, Keyes established that Deputy Fire Chief Lauper
agreed with the conclusions contained in Inspector Halverson's report (Trial Tr.,
p.387, Ls.2-19), then had him read those conclusions with respect to the cause
of the fire: "It is this investigator's opinion that the cause of the fire is incendiary
in nature" (Trial Tr., p.390, Ls.1-3).
After the jury deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty (R., p.211), Keyes
renewed his motion for mistrial on the basis of Deputy Fire Chief Lauper's
statement "that this was an incendiary fire and that it had been caused or lit by
my client" (Trial Tr., p.498, Ls.21-25). The district court later held a hearing on
the renewed motion. (Trial Tr., p.502, Ls.13-16.) After hearing argument by the
parties, the district court issued it's final order denying Keyes's motion for mistrial
on the record in open court:
I have given this a lot of thought, and I appreciate the brief
the State has done and, of course the briefing that Mr. Neils did at
the time of trial.
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The first issue is the testimony by the fire chief, or assistant
fire chief - I forget which he was - called as an expert at trial. His
testimony was the effect that the - when asked the cause of the
fire, statements were made that the fire was caused by the
intentional acts of the defendant, which first of all, I want to
emphasize what was implicit in the statement I made earlier, that, in
reviewing this, there was certainly nothing improper about the
question or the way the question was asked by Mr. Rierson. It was
a proper question. It was simply the response from the deputy
chief that was unacceptable. And at the time of trial, I instructed
the jury in what I thought was very strong language that this
testimony was not acceptable, that the chief - the witness, I should
say, knew or at a minimum should have known better than to
provide testimony that invades the province of the jury, that the jury
was to completely disregard that testimony and they were the ones
that were to make the factual findings here, not the witness. I
thought the language I used was quite strong. And the jury is
presumed to ... follow the instructions of the court. Nothing to
indicate they didn't do that or wouldn't do that.
In hindsight I don't see how it could have been handled any
different. Of course, Mr. Neil's point is that, no matter how you
handled it, the response was improper and should have entitled
him to a mistrial. I find that - let me make one other point. And
that is that, it would not be surprising that - let me back up. This
was not simply any run-of-the-mill expert witness. This was an
expert witness who was an employee of the fire department, who
was in effect part of the prosecution team in this case. There was a
fire department employee sitting with Mr. Rierson during the trial.
The jury knew that. And I don't think it would have come as much
of a surprise to the jury that the fire department was blaming the
defendant for the fire and considered it arson. Nevertheless, I did
instruct them to disregard that, and I think the presumption that the
jury would follow my instruction is correct.
This case is distinguishable in that respect from the State
versus Walters case that Mr. Neils has relied upon.

Accordingly, the motion for mistrial is denied.
(Trial Tr., p.510, L.16 - p.512, L.14, p.515, Ls.21-22.)
Keyes timely appealed. (R., pp. 263-265.)
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ISSUE
Keyes states the issue on appeal as:
Did Deputy Lauper's testimony that Mr. Keyes had deliberated [sic]
started the fire impermissibly invade the province of the jury?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Has Keyes failed to show the district court erred by denying his motion for a
mistrial based on a single statement that was remedied by a curative instruction?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion By Denying Keyes's Motion
For Mistrial
A.

Introduction
On direct examination, the state asked Deputy Fire Chief Lauper, who

investigated the fire, his opinion as to the "origins of the fire." (Trial Tr., p.35D,
Ls.17 -19.) Deputy Fire Chief Lauper responded: "It's an incendiary fire. The fire
was deliberately set by the defendant."

(Trial Tr., p.35D, Ls.22-23.)

Keyes

claims the district court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial based on
this testimony. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-1 D.) Keyes claims he was entitled to the
mistrial because Deputy Fire Chief Lauper "testified as to the ultimate issue for
the jury's determination: whether Mr. Keyes deliberately set the fire." (Appellant's
Brief, p.6.) Keyes's claim lacks merit. The Deputy Fire Chief's statement had no
prejudicial impact on the jury because the district court immediately gave the jury
a curative instruction.

As such, Keyes has failed to establish that the district

court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it denied his
motion for a mistrial.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal, the standard for review of a motion for mistrial is well-

established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of the circumstances existing when
the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be
whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial
represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full
record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a
7

criminal case, the 'abuse of discretion' standard is a misnomer. The
standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error. [The
appellate court's] focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of
the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's
refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident,
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993).

C.

The District Court Properly Determined That Keyes Was Not Entitled To A
Mistrial
1)

The Expert Properly Testified That The Fire Was Deliberately Set

Keyes claims the district court should have granted a mistrial because
"this case hinged on whether the jury believed Mr. Keyes that the fire occurred
accidentally and that he only intended to light a fire in the fireplace, or if it
believed the fire department witnesses who testified as to multiple sources of
origin." (Appellant's brief, p.10.) In other words, Keyes's objection on appeal is
directed to that portion of the objected-to statement that asserted the fire was
intentionally set, rather than that portion of the statement that asserted Keyes
was the individual who set the fire. As such, Keyes has failed to establish any
error in the introduction of this statement, let alone reversible error when the
motion for mistrial was denied after the jury had been immediately instructed to
disregard the statement.
As an initial matter, Keyes has waived this issue on appeal, as there were
several other statements entered into evidence, without objection, expressing the
fire inspectors' conclusion that the fire was intentionally set. "It is a fundamental
tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial
court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,
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398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).

Keyes did not object to Inspector

Halverson's testimony, and did not ask for a continuing objection after objecting
to Deputy Fire Chief Lauper's initial statement, and did not object to his
subsequent statement that the fire was intentionally set.

Keyes also elicited

further testimony from Deputy Fire Chief Lauper that the fire was intentionally
set. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for appeal. See also State v. Barnes,
147 Idaho 587,597,212 P.3d 1017,1027 (Ct. App. 2009).
Even if Keyes's appellate argument is considered, the testimony was not
improper. Expert witnesses may testify in the form of an opinion provided that:
(1) they are properly qualified as an expert by their knowledge, skill, experience,
or training; and (2) their specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. I.R.E. 702. Idaho Rule
of Evidence 704 also provides that opinion testimony "is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." I.R.E.
704.
Keyes's reliance on State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 27, 35
(1988), for his claim that Deputy Fire Chief Lauper's testimony that the fire was
intentionally set impermissibly invaded the province of the jury, is misplaced.
The Hester Court determined that expert testimony that the child had been
abused, an ultimate issue for the jury, was proper and did not invade the
province of the jury. However, the court held that the expert exceeded the proper
bounds of expert testimony when the expert testified that Hester was the abuser.
Hester, 114 Idaho at 692-96, 760 P.2d at 31-35. The court stated that "having an
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"having an expert render an opinion as to the identity of the abuser is more of an
invasion of the jury's function rather than an 'assist' to the trier of fact."

~

at

695, 760 P.2d at 34. Testimony regarding the identity of the abuser embraced
the ultimate issue in the case, whether or not Hester was the individual who
abused the child, i.e., whether or not Hester was guilty.

~

Deputy Fire Chief Lauper testified that, based on his investigation and the
investigation of the other fire inspectors, he had concluded that the fire was
intentionally set. Such a conclusion required scientific, technical and specialized
knowledge that assisted the trier of fact to understand the evidence before it - to
understand that the observations by the fire investigators indicated that the fire
was intentionally, rather than accidentally, set. As in Hester, the expert testimony
that the fire was intentionally set, though an ultimate issue for the jury, was
proper and did not invade the province of the jury.

2)

The District Court Properly Denied The Motion For Mistrial

If Keyes's appeal is construed as being directed to Deputy Fire Chief
Lauper's statement regarding the identity of the person who set the fires, he has
failed to establish reversible error on the part of the district court.
The question reviewing courts must ask is "whether the event or events
which brought about the motion for mistrial constitute reversible error when
viewed in the context of the entire record." State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389,
924 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Ct. App. 1996).

Error is not reversible if the appellate

court "can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been
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the same if the error had not occurred." State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, _ ,
224 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2010).
Here, Keyes has not established reversible error. The basis for Keyes's
motion for mistrial was Deputy Fire Chief Lauper's statement, in response to a
question about the origins of the fire, that "[i]t's an incendiary fire. The fire was
deliberately set by the defendant." (Trial Tr., p.350, Ls.22-23.) Keyes objected
and immediately received a strongly worded instruction to the jury to disregard
the statement:
The objection is sustained. The jury will disregard the statements
of the witness attributing fault to the defendant. That's the province
of the jury. The witness knows and should know and counsel
should know that that is not proper for him to be stating. And you
will disregard it. That is your function. It is not his function.
(Trial Tr., p.351, Ls.1-7.)
It is well established that "[w]here improper testimony is inadvertently
introduced into a trial and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard
such evidence, it is ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the court's
instruction entirely." State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct.
App.2004). Consequently, unless there is an "'overwhelming probability' that the
jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that
the effect of the evidence would be 'devastating'" it is "presume[d] that a jury will
follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence."

kL. (citing ).

The district court, in ruling on the motion for mistrial, recognized that the
state did not intentionally elicit the statement (Trial Tr., p.511, Ls.1-6), that the
jury was promptly instructed to disregard the statement (Trial Tr., p.511, Ls.6-18,
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p.512,

Ls.9-11) and that there was nothing to indicate,

let alone an

"overwhelming probability" that the jury was unable to follow the instruction (Trial
Tr., p.511, Ls.6-18, p.512, Ls.9-11). The court, therefore, concluded that Keyes
had not shown the statement, in light of the immediate curative instruction,
merited a mistrial.
Keyes has not shown how these determinations were erroneous. The jury
was promptly instructed to disregard the testimony of the witness. Keyes has not
shown by an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was unable to follow the
court's instruction to disregard the statement. Any error in the admission of the
testimony was cured by the immediate instruction.

Keyes himself has

acknowledged that the case did not hinge on establishing his identity, but in
establishing whether the fire was intentionally or accidentally set.
brief, p.10.)

(Appellant's

Keyes has failed to establish reversible error in the denial of his

motion for mistrial.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction
entered upon the jury's verdict finding Keyes guilty of first degree arson.
th

DATED this 13 day of August, 2010.

L./

ebekah A. Cude
Deputy Attorney General
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JUSTIN M. CURTIS
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to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defenders' basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

ekah A. Cude
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